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RECENT DECISIONS
INSURANCE- APPLICATION OF PUERTO RicAx DIRECT ACTIoN
STATUTE IN NEW YORK DE Fm NOT VIOLATIVE OF PUBLIc
PoLicy. - Plaintiff, a New York domiciliary, was injured while on
vacation in Puerto Rico. Pursuant to a Puerto Rican direct action
statute," she brought a negligence action in New York directly
against defendant-insurer. Defendant moved to dismiss on the
ground that an action directly against an insurer contravened New
York's public policy. In reversing the unanimous ruling of the
appellate division, the New York Court of Appeals held that the
Puerto Rican statute was substantive rather than procedural, since
it created a right to proceed directly against the insurer, and that
such a cause of action did not violate New York's public policy.
Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256
N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
In line with the majority of jurisdictions, New York has not
enacted a direct action statute. Generally, therefore, an aggrieved
party may not proceed directly against an insurer but must bring
his negligence suit in the first instance against the insured wrong-
doer.2 This policy is based upon New York's traditional view that
in a negligence suit, the admission to the jury of the defendant's
insurance coverage might prove to be unduly prejudicial to the
insured defendant.3
However, a minority of jurisdictions has enacted statutes which
allow an injured plaintiff to proceed in specified instances directly
against an insurance company without the necessity of first suing
the insured.4  These statutes differ in various respects. For ex-
I "The insurer issuing a policy insuring any person against loss or damage
through legal liability for the bodily injury, death, or damage to property of
a third person, shall become absolutely liable whenever a loss covered by the
policy occurs, and payment of such loss by the insurer . . . shall not depend
upon payment by the insured of or upon any final judgment against him aris-
ing out of such occurrence." P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26 § 2001 (1958). "Any
individual sustaining damages and losses shall have, at his option, a direct
action against the insurer under the terms and limitations of the policy, which
action he may exercise against the insurer only or against the insurer and
the insured jointly. The liability of the insurer shall not exceed that provided
for in the policy, and the court shall determine, not only the liability of the
insurer, but also the amount of the loss. Any action brofight under this
section shall be subject to the conditions of the policy or contract and to the
defenses that may be pleaded by the insurer to the direct action instituted
by the insured." P.R_ LAWS ANN. tit. 26 § 2003(1) (1958).
2 Thirty days after service of notice of entry of judgment on the insurer,
the injured party may proceed directly against the insurer on the judgment.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 167(1)(b).
3 See Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 1 App. Div. 2d 116, 123, 148 N.Y.S.
2d 524, 530 (2d Dep't 1955), aff'd, 4 N.Y2d 488, 151 N.E.2d 881, 176 N.Y.S.
2d 329 (1958).4 Aax. STAT. ANN. § 66-3240 (Supp. 1963) (limited to entities not sub-ject to suit for tort); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1950); RI. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 27-7-2 (1956) (limited to situations where no jurisdiction is
obtainable over the insured); WIs. STAT. § 204.30 (4) (1957) (limited to
motor vehicle suits).
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ample, Rhode Island has limited this right of action to locally
written insurance contracts,5 whereas Louisiana has granted this
right to a party involved in any accident within the state., More-
over, in several jurisdictions where such statutes have not been
enacted, the courts have nevertheless permitted an injured party
to proceed directly against the insurer on the theory that
the existence of compulsory insurance evidences a legislative intent
to protect and benefit the injured party.7
A problem consequently arises, as in the instant case, when a
person is injured in a direct action jurisdiction and seeks to enforce
his claim in a non-direct action forum. For example, Michigan
refused to entertain such an action on the ground that it was vio-
lative of its public policy as indicated by a state statute expressly
forbidding the disclosure of insurance in negligence suits.8 Although
New York has no such legislation, its courts have maintained a
long-standing policy against the disclosure of insurance coverage to
a jury when such disclosure might be prejudicial in favor of an
injured plaintiff. In fact, the courts have held that the mere men-
tion of insurance may constitute reversible error if the fact of insur-
ance coverage is irrelevant to the case.9 This court-made rule has
been applied so strictly that an insured may not even implead his
insurer, since it has been held that to do so might unduly influence
the jury.1°
On facts similar to those in the instant case, the appellate
division in Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co.1 dismissed an action based
on a Louisiana direct action statute. In that case the injury took
place in Louisiana and the plaintiff sought to enforce his claim in
New York. The court reasoned that the policy of withholding from
a jury any knowledge of the defendant's insurance was of such a
nature and of sufficient importance to justify disallowing the action.
5 Riding v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 48 RI. 433, 138 AtI. 186 (1927).
8 See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
7 See James v. Young, 77 N.D. 451, 455-59, 43 N.W.2d 692, 695-98(1950); Enders v. Longmire, 179 Okla. 633, 67 P.2d 12 (1937); cf. Grasso
v. Cannon Ball Motor Freight Lines, 124 Tex. 154, 81 S.W.2d 482 (1935)
(initial judgment against insured held a necessary prerequisite to suit against
insurer).
8 See Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d
547 (1946), wherein plaintiff was injured in Wisconsin and commenced an
action against a New York insurance company doing business in Michigan.
The court held that a suit commenced directly against an insurer would be
contrary to Michigan public policy which forbade the mentioning of insurance
to juries.
9 E.g., Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N.Y. 479, 490, 95 N.E. 10, 14-15
(1911); Tacktill v. Eastern Capitol Lines, Inc., 260 App. Div. 58, 61, 21
N.Y.S.2d 14, 17 (1st Dep't 1940).
20 Kelly v. Yannotti, 4 N.Y.2d 603, 152 N.E.2d 69, 176 N.Y.S.2d 637(1958).
11 1 App. Div. 2d 116, 148 N.Y.S.2d 524 (2d Dep't 1955), aft'd, 4 N.Y.2d
488, 151 N.E.2d 881, 176 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1958).
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The court also stated that the venue provisions of the Louisiana
statute limited the action to courts of that forum. The court of
appeals affirmed solely on the basis of the restrictive venue pro-
visions in the Louisiana statute.12  It is interesting to note that
shortly after Morton, the Second Circuit was called upon to enforce
the same Louisiana statute in light of New York law and reached
an opposite result by interpreting the restrictive venue provisions
as being applicable only to suits brought in Louisiana.'13 The court
further stated that the law of New York was unsettled in this area
and that it could not be definitely established that to enforce such
a claim would be in opposition to New York's public policy. 4
Thus, prior to the principal case, it appeared that two contradictory
views existed in New York with respect to the recognition and
application of foreign direct action statutes.
In the instant case, the Court was confronted initially with the
problem of whether the Puerto Rican substantive law, rather than
the substantive law of the forum, should be applied. After de-
ciding that Puerto Rico had the more significant contacts with the
injury and that its substantive law should therefore be applied,1 5
the Court was then compelled to determine whether the Puerto
Rican direct action statute was procedural or substantive in nature.
If the relevant provisions of the statute were merely procedural,
New York law would apply, whereas if that statute was more
properly labelled as substantive, Puerto Rican law would dictate the
final disposition of the case. The Court of Appeals held that since
the statute gave an injured party a right of action against an in-
surer, which did not exist prior to the enactment of the statute, it
was thereby substantive.2'
The question of New York public policy concerning insurance
was vital to the Court's determination, for a New York court is not
compelled to apply a foreign statute which is repugnant to its public
policy. 7 The opinion indicated that merely because New York
courts would, in the first instance, handle the problem differently
was not a sufficient reason to compel the conclusion that the en-
forcement of any such foreign statute would be violative of its public
1 Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 4 N.Y.2d 488, 151 N.E.2d 881, 176
N.Y.S.2d 329 (1958).
13 Collins'v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956).
14 Id. at 423.
15 See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963).
16 See Aponte v. American Sur. Co., 276 F.2d 678, 680 (1st Cir. 1960);
Bosco v. Foreman's Fund Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 432, 434 (D.P.R. 1959),
wherein the Puerto Rican District Court characterized the statute as "sub-
stantive." In Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954),
the Supreme Court approved Louisiana's characterization of its direct action
statute as "substantive," since it created a separate and distinct cause of
action against the insurer.
'7 RESTATEmENT, CONFLIcT OF LAws § 612 (1934).
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policy.' 8 The Court further noted that the fact of insurance coverage
is not always kept from the jury. For example, the disclosure of
insurance coverage to a jury has been the practice in this state
whenever such evidence was relevant. 9 In addition, the Court took
judicial notice of the fact that whenever insurance coverage is in-
volved, most jurors are not ignorant of that fact. Hence, the mere
fact that the maintenance of this direct action would inform the
jury that the insurance company was the real party in interest would
not per se violate New York's public policy.
The Court in Oltarsh did not intend to extend New York's
policy which severely limits the disclosure of insurance to a jury,
but meant to clarify the existing law in this area. However, the
implication reasonably to be drawn from the decision would suggest
an apparent loosening of the state's policy which normally disallows
the divulgence of insurance in jury cases. Should a lower court
adopt a more lenient attitude because of this decision, certain
problems may arise which heretofore have been dormant. The
question of how far an attorney may proceed in "hinting" of the
defendant's insurance coverage is still within the discretion of the
trial court, for the instant case leaves the question unanswered.
However, the rule regarding disclosure of insurance to the jury may
very well be relaxed in light of this decision.
The result arrived at in this case seems to be somewhat dele-
terious when one carefully scrutinizes the direct action statutes of
the various jurisdictions. Each of these direct action jurisdictions
maintains built in "safety valves" for the protection of the insurer.
For example, the Louisiana Constitution provides for a de novo
review by the appellate courtsi 2 while the Puerto Rican civil law
dictates that cases be tried without juries.21 When New York applies
foreign direct action statutes, these "safety valves" will not be
available to the defendant, since they are merely procedural in
nature. Thus, the plaintiff will have certain procedural advantages
in New York which might inure to his benefit. These procedural
advantages may well result in a plaintiff recovering a larger
verdict than he could have obtained in the direct action jurisdiction
itself. Such a result would be anomalous and hardly intended by
the Court of Appeals. Yet such an inference is irresistible.
Furthermore, one jurisdiction has interpreted its direct action
statute so as to deprive the defendant-insurer of certain defenses
he might otherwise have asserted against the insured if the latter
18 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 201
(1918).
19 Leotta v. Plessinger, 8 N.Y.2d 449, 171 N.E.2d 454, 209 N.Y.S.2d
450 (1960).
20 LA. CoNsT. art VII, § 29.
21 Brief for Defendant-Respondent, pp. 16-17.
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had been a party to the litigation.2 2 It has always been the policy




Consequently, if the New York courts enforce direct action statutes
as interpreted by the courts of the encting jurisdictions, the strong
public policy of this state concerning the defenses available to the
insurer may be abrogated.
The direct action statute does have the advantage of preventing
collusion between the insured and his insurer. Therefore, the lack
of cooperation by the insured cannot defeat the right of the injured
party against the insurer. However, such protection is already
provided in New York's Insurance Law.24
If the insurer is permitted to interpose against the injured
party those defenses available against the insured, and if the pro-
cedural "safety valves" are provided to keep jury verdicts in their
proper perspective, deleterious implications to be drawn from the
instant case will be obviated. However, the possible loss of defenses
by the insurer, coupled with the fact that New York may be invit-
ing forum-shopping by providing a forum which will enforce direct
action statutes without procedural "safety valves," would seem to
indicate that the Court in the instant case did not reach a. wholly
satisfactory result.
LABOR LAW - SEcTIONS 8(a) (5) AND 9(a) - SUBCONTRACT-
ING ix AcCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PRACTICE HELD NoT
MANDATORY SUBJECT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.- Since the
1940's the respondent-employer, an appliance manufacturer, had
unilaterally subcontracted approximately four thousand jobs, all of
which could have been performed by his own employees. Although
the union had never challenged this custom, in 1963 it filed a
complaint with the National Labor Relations Board in which it
demanded the right to bargain concerning the employer's decision
to subcontract. In reversing the trial examiner, the National
Labor Relations Board held that subcontracting which merely con-
tinues a long established practice, without significantly changing
existing terms or conditions of employment, is not subject to man-
22West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950) (failure
of insured to cooperate not available as a defense against injured party).
Contra, Cespuglio v. Cespuglio, 238 Wis. 603, 300 N.W. 780 (1941).23 Roth v. National Auto. Mut. Cas. Co., 202 App. Div. 667, 195 N.Y.
Supp. 865 (1st Dep't 1922) ; Killeen v. General Acc. Assur. Corp., 131 Misc.
691, 227 N.Y. Supp. 220 (N.Y. County Ct. 1928).
24 Under New York law, the injured party can protect himself from
the insured's failure to give notice to his insurer by giving such notice him-
self. N.Y. Ixs. LAw § 167(1) (c).
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